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THE TRACKER PLAN: A CONTROLLED
RISK DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
RETIREMENT PROGRAM
ROWLAND M. DAVIS, F.S.A.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States retirement system is in the early stages of
a slow motion crisis. Numerous articles and books have portrayed
the dismal details, but the conclusion is always the same: most of
today’s workers are headed for an insecure retirement. If not
corrected, the current retirement system will lead to some
combination of the following:
- Dramatic reductions in the living standards for many senior
citizens; and/or,
- Significant increases in the public support provided to senior
citizens (in effect, another deferred obligation which will be
passed on to future generations of workers and taxpayers, albeit
a largely hidden obligation).

The current retirement system can be characterized as a
relatively modest pay-as-you-go defined benefit Social Security
program. The system is supplemented by a highly fragmented
collection of voluntary savings and benefit arrangements. Due to
the voluntary nature of this system, employers provide no
coverage at all for nearly half of the workforce. Others that may be
covered face the risk of sudden sharp reductions in coverage and
benefits when plans are closed or frozen. At the individual level,
workers are often being asked to make a wide variety of complex
financial decisions for which they are poorly prepared.
Furthermore, these arrangements are clustered at the two
extremes of the risk-sharing spectrum. At one end are the so* Rowland Davis is a self-employed consulting pension actuary. During the
last fifteen years, working in partnership with Hewitt EnnisKnupp, he has
specialized in helping large pension funds assess their risk tolerance and
develop appropriate strategic asset allocation policies, using asset-liability
studies. Prior to that he provided traditional actuarial services, including
pension valuations and plan design studies, with various employers, including
Davis, Conder, Enderle & Sloan, and Towers Perrin. He graduated from
Lawrence University, magna cum laude, with a mathematics degree. This
Article was originally published by the Society of Actuaries in The Pension
Forum, Volume 19, Number 1, December 2012. This Article is reprinted with
permission.
681

Do Not Delete

682

10/18/2013 4:27 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:681

called “traditional” pension plans, where a fixed benefit is
determined at retirement based on a specific formula, and that
benefit is payable for life. The financial obligation, and risks, of
meeting that promise falls to the sponsor. (If the arrangement is
voluntary the worker is actually exposed to a significant amount of
risk. If the sponsor decides to close the plan, the worker in midcareer absorbs a major financial shock. This hidden risk factor for
voluntary pension plans has become apparent in recent years
when sponsors have abandoned their pension arrangements.) At
the other end of the spectrum are the “traditional” defined
contribution plans. These include plans such as 401(k)
arrangements, where the sponsor merely matches some portion of
employee contributions. The individual decides how much to save
and how to invest the funds. The uncertain outcome of these
decisions leaves the worker at significant risk. This framework has
not worked. Nobel laureate Robert Merton summarized the
situation well in a recent address:
The essence of the current challenge is thus: Defined benefit is
expensive to the sponsor, but its beneficiaries very much like the
simplicity and security of the payout pattern it offers as base
coverage. Defined contribution is a lot less expensive and well
defined in terms of risk exposure for the sponsor but is too complex
and too risky for the end user.1

A new framework is needed—one that significantly increases
our aggregate savings, spreads it among all workers, and shares
risk in a manageable way for all parties. And this new framework
is needed soon. Although the crisis unfolds in slow motion, and
thus is not very prominent on the public’s radar, retirement
savings are a long-term endeavor. As such, delays make the
problems much larger and more difficult to solve. Lost savings
opportunities cannot be back-filled, especially in the challenging
economic environment we now face.
Most benefit professionals believe that the best retirement
structures for the future are risk-sharing arrangements that
combine many of the best elements from the current traditional
plans. This Article presents the Tracker Plan, which is just such a
risk-sharing arrangement, and describes how it could fit into a
restructured retirement system. The Article will proceed as
follows. Section 2 describes the overall framework for thinking
about retirement systems, showing where the Tracker Plan fits
and the role it is designed to fill. Section 3 provides details on how
the Tracker Plan is structured. Section 4 shows the results of back
testing the Tracker Plan using historical experience, and measures
1. Robert C. Merton, Ph.D., Keynote Address at the 2005 NCREIF/PREA
Conference (Oct. 21, 2005).
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the effectiveness of the plan through a Monte Carlo simulation
model. Section 5 describes the major choices available to policy
makers, and offers some suggestions and rationale for these
suggestions. Separate subsections will look at coverage provisions,
uniformity, the size of benefits and employer cost, the operational
framework, the investment framework, and supplemental plan
arrangements. Section 6 compares the Tracker Plan with a closely
comparable defined benefit arrangement. Section 7 introduces a
way to quantify results in a simple manner, so that different
design options can be easily compared.
II. RETIREMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
The most comprehensive framework for describing retirement
systems is one used by the World Bank in its Pension Reform
Primer.2 This framework describes five separate components, or
pillars:
- Zero Pillar – non-contributory basic benefit financed by the
government.
- First Pillar – mandatory pay-as-you-go government plan with
contributions linked to earnings and objective of partial income
replacement.
- Second Pillar – mandatory defined contribution plan with
independent investment management.
- Third Pillar – voluntary pension and retirement savings plans,
both employer sponsored and individual.
- Fourth Pillar – informal support (e.g. family), other formal social
programs (e.g. health care, housing), and other individual assets
(e.g. home ownership).

The United States does not have a broad-based Zero Pillar
program that is specifically designed for senior citizens, and Social
Security provides the First Pillar benefits. There are also no
mandatory Second Pillar programs, and all the various plans that
comprise our private retirement system fall into the Third Pillar.
In this Article I assume that the Social Security system
remains largely in its current form. This means that all workers
must participate and contribute, and benefits will be based on a
formula that creates a progressive structure of partial income
replacement at projected levels based on indexed career earnings.
(Specifically, my retirement accumulation targets are based on
2. Robert Holzmann, Richard P. Hinz, & Mark Dorfman, Pension Systems
and Reform Conceptual Framework, SOCIAL PROTECTION AND LABOR, THE
WORLD
BANK
(June
2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SPDiscussion-papers/Pensions-DP/0824.pdf.
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projected Social Security benefits in 2049, at which time benefits
for an average worker will be about 20% less than for currently
retiring workers.) The Tracker Plan fits into the Second Pillar,
although there is a policy choice of a completely mandatory
program or one based on auto-enrollment with an opt-out
provision. I also assume that a strong set of options will be
available in the Third Pillar to provide supplemental benefits on a
voluntary basis. The Third Pillar might function much like today’s
system, but with benefits resized and redesigned to reflect the new
Tracker Plan benefits from the Second Pillar.
Here is my rationale for this choice of overall structure. The
current system of voluntary Third Pillar plans is failing—with
very weak coverage and with inadequate benefits for many of
those that are covered. The United States government is not in a
position now, or anytime soon, to offer more tax incentives to
broaden coverage—but failing to expand coverage and savings is
just another form of deferred obligation for future generations. The
only viable solution is to create a universal program that is
mandatory, or at least a nearly universal program through a
combination of mandates and automatic default provisions. Any
such program must be fully funded and, because of the need for
some level of mandates, it cannot impose significant financial risks
or administrative burdens on employers.
Accomplishing everything through a single program is
unrealistic. Therefore, the Tracker Plan should be limited in scope,
and a robust set of Third Pillar arrangements would complete the
overall system. The goal for the Tracker Plan is to provide a
structure where workers can easily meet their basic retirement
needs, without the need for complex decisions or choices. This
indicates that a highly standardized set of provisions emphasizing
risk control is needed, where the primary decision is to be in the
plan (the default option) or to be out of the plan. Supplemental
Third Pillar plans can offer the flexibility and choice that some
workers desire, and because of the controlled level of risk in the
base Tracker Plan benefits, these supplemental plans can offer
opportunities for enhanced returns which would entail more risk
and uncertainty.
III. THE TRACKER PLAN
This section describes the specific operation of the Tracker
Plan: the particulars of how money flows into the plan, how money
is invested, and what happens at retirement. Where choices are
available for certain plan parameters, I indicate the selections I
am using to present the analysis in this Article and the rationale
for these selections. Section 5 provides more discussion of policy
choices that are required before implementation. However the
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program is implemented, the parameters for the program must be
uniform, or very nearly uniform, across the full United States
workforce. Without this uniformity the Tracker Plan concept loses
a great deal of its strength.
A. Overview
At the participant level, Tracker Plan’s major goals are to:
- Provide an automatic path for participants to follow in
accumulating the assets required to meet their retirement
income needs.
- Control the risk of adverse outcomes, where assets are
insufficient to meet needs.
- Provide full portability throughout a career with multiple
employers.

At the macro program level, the major goals are to:
- Have universal coverage.
- Operate the plan(s) and manage the investments efficiently,
professionally, and at a low cost to the participants.
- Keep employer obligations, both financial and administrative, at
reasonable and manageable levels, with a known upper limit on
annual cost under worst-case conditions.
- Never have unfunded obligations.

Traditional defined contribution arrangements have two
common criticisms: (1) they are too risky for participants, and (2)
participants lack the skills and training needed to make the
critical financial and investment choices required for successful
outcomes. The Tracker Plan meets these problems by primarily
emphasizing risk control and simplicity:
- For each participant there is a single investment vehicle that
gradually decreases risk over the course of a career (i.e. the
target date fund concept is utilized—but at a lower level of risk
than is common in today’s funds).
- There is a standard contribution pattern to follow throughout the
participant’s career, designed to accumulate to the required
target amount at retirement.
- Progress towards the target is monitored, and adjustments are
made according to a fixed set of operational rules based on
tracking error:
- If performance is adverse and the fund is tracking below the
desired target path, then additional contributions may be
triggered, up to a fixed maximum add-on.
- If performance is favorable and the fund is tracking above
the desired target path, then the investment risk may be
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reduced to preserve the cushion.

Risk control is a critical objective. Specific measures and
standards are needed to determine whether the amount of risk is
contained within reasonable levels. My selected standards are: (A)
the participant will meet or exceed the desired target asset
accumulation with about 90% confidence, and (B) for those cases
where the target is not met, the shortfall can be managed with
relatively painless steps, which would include working no longer
than one year beyond the regular retirement date. These specific
standards became the benchmark test for each design option
analyzed with the Monte Carlo simulator. Through an iterative
process I refined each of the design parameters to optimize the
risk control results. The remaining subsections describe the
specific Tracker Plan model that resulted from this process. There
are subjective calls made along the way, but mostly these were to
maintain simplicity of design unless there were noticeable
improvements in the risk control outcomes.
B. Scope of Coverage
The Tracker Plan is designed as a Pillar 2 program to ensure
that workers can maintain a reasonable standard of living in their
retirement years. I would characterize the Tracker Plan as a core
benefit, to work in combination with Social Security. To maintain
emphasis on core benefits and to control employer costs for this
Pillar 2 program, I suggest that an earnings cap apply when
contributions are determined. A cap that would not restrict
contribution levels for media-income workers seems reasonable.
The level of the cap should then be tied to the median level of
earnings for workers in the latter portion of their careers, when
merit and seniority effects are embedded in their pay levels. Based
on the 2008 Current Population Survey from the Census Bureau,
the median earnings for workers age 55 to 64 years old is $50,000.
For administrative simplicity, the cap could be tied to some other
average wage figure already in use by the government for other
purposes, such as the Average Wage Index (AWI), which is used in
the calculation of Social Security benefits. In 2008, Social Security
benefits were calculated on the basis of earnings indexed up to the
2006 AWI of $38,651, so the earnings cap could be pegged,
hypothetically, at around 130% of the AWI from two years prior.
For workers with pay that exceeds the cap, supplemental
plans may be offered by employers to provide a more complete
retirement savings package. Possible supplemental arrangements
are discussed in Section 5.
Broad participation is a critical goal, so auto-enrollment
procedures should be used. A mandatory participation framework
could also be considered, but that may be a difficult political
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choice. Employers would be required to enroll workers
automatically at hire. Also, there should be a schedule of later
auto-enrollment events for those not participating, perhaps at age
35 and again at age 40. These scheduled events would also provide
focal points for communication with all workers about the need for
adequate retirement savings.
C. Retirement Income Target
The first parameter choice is to select a target level for
retirement income. I choose a target 75% income replacement ratio
at age 65, inclusive of Social Security, for a worker with median
career earnings. This means that at age 65 the total income
available from Social Security benefits plus the Tracker Plan
benefits will be equal to 75% of the worker’s gross income at the
time of retirement. The Tracker Plan’s benefits are based on
annuitizing the accumulated funds at age 65, with an assumed
post-retirement increase factor of 2.5% per year. The Social
Security benefit used is based on retirement at age 65 in 2049, and
this produces a 32% replacement ratio for Social Security alone. To
meet the 75% overall target the Tracker Plan benefit should
replace 43% of pre-retirement income.
More specifically, recognizing the risk control objectives
stated in the previous section, the Tracker Plan benefit should
equal or exceed 43% of final pay with a probability of about 90%,
and should almost never fall much below 38% of final pay (a 5-6%
shortfall is about what a worker can expect to recover by working
to age 66 instead of age 65).
The 75% income replacement target is well supported by
various researchers as one that will generally allow medium-level
earners to maintain their standard of living after retirement. This
reflects the changes that occur in medium-level earners tax and
savings situation. In particular, the long-running Georgia State
University/Aon Insurance project on replacement rates shows that
medium earners need 78% of their pre-retirement income in order
to maintain the same standard of living after retirement.3
However, some experts note that a higher income replacement
target is required when medical costs after retirement are more
carefully recognized with respect to the future rate of medical cost
inflation, and potential reforms that might shift more of the cost to
retirees.
Forty years into the future, the retirement age for full Social
Security benefits will be age 67. I choose age 65 as my target
3. Dr. Bruce Palmer, 2008 Replacement Ratio Study™, AON CONSULTING
(2008),
http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectualcapital/attachments/human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf.
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retirement age to reflect that many workers retire before the age
where they can receive full Social Security benefits, and also
because delayed retirement becomes the ultimate tool available for
participants to deal with adverse investment experience in any
defined contribution arrangement. Choosing a target retirement
age later than age 65 would effectively remove, or at least
diminish, this important risk management option for workers
when they must bear the residual risk from a defined contribution
program.
D. Fund Investments
Accumulated contributions to the Tracker Plan for each
participant will be invested in a single tracker fund, which has a
declining allocation to equity assets as the worker moves toward
retirement age. This is the well-accepted idea behind target date
funds that is based on the life cycle financial framework
(recognizing both financial assets and the human capital provided
by future income-earning years). However, within the Tracker
Plan framework, the risk control objectives play a very important
role in determining the proper level of investment risk. To keep
the retirement benefit risk within the desired constraints, the
overall investment risk should be significantly lower than what is
commonly embedded in many of the target date funds in use
today.
The fund allocations will be among three separate investment
pools: (1) a risk asset portfolio, which would be a diversified
portfolio of equities and other assets that has the objective of
earning the best long-term risk premium possible; (2) a fixed
income portfolio, which would include core bond holdings similar
to the Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index; and (3) a stable value fund
invested in TIPS, which has the objective of earning a stable real
return. For a core benefit arrangement like the Tracker Plan, the
investment process must meet two critical standards:
- Controlled Risk – Risk cannot be avoided, but the fund
investment decisions must always focus on the long-term goal of
accumulating toward a fixed target amount with a very limited
risk of shortfall at retirement age.
- Low Expenses – A low expense ratio is extremely important for
the fund, which can be accomplished if the funds are large in
scale (discussed more fully as part of the organizational
structure of the plan) and likely use of passive investment funds
for a substantial portion of the assets.

After testing a wide range of alternatives with the Monte
Carlo simulation model, Chart 1 shows the allocation pattern, or
glide path, that maximizes the return while keeping downside risk
within the required range.
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Chart 1

The fund starts with a 75% allocation to the risk asset
portfolio and a 25% allocation to the fixed income portfolio. The
equity allocation begins to decline at age 35, and the decline
becomes more pronounced at age 45. By age 60 the equity
allocation reaches 15% and remains at that level until retirement
(subject to a possible dynamic adjustment discussed in the section
on the tracker adjustment process). Between ages 50 and 60 there
is also a shift from the fixed income portfolio to the stable value
fund. This is to provide protection against unexpected inflation in
the years just prior to retirement, which can cause major
investment losses in a standard fixed income portfolio at the worst
possible portion of the asset accumulation process.
In theory, there would be a separate tracker fund for each
age cohort, but since the allocation remains steady until age 35,
the worker would enter his or her specific tracker fund at that age.
Prior to age 35, however, everyone will be in a common 75/25 fund.
Furthermore, the Tracker Plan concept should work well even if
three-year age groups are consolidated into a single tracker fund.
Eventually there would then be 10 separate tracker funds
maintained at any one time for workers between ages 35 and 65.
Each worker would own the appropriate number of units in each of
the three portfolios to maintain his or her allocation target.
E. Contribution Schedule
To provide a lifetime income equal to 43% of final pay
requires a total fund accumulation equal to 7.5 times final pay at
age 65, assuming a 2.5% annual increase in the benefit after
retirement and using a real yield rate of 2% and projected future
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mortality rates to price an annuity factor. However, the preretirement investment and inflation risk factors mean that any
future accumulation amount can only be described by a
distribution of possible amounts, and the goal of the Tracker Plan
is to create a distribution where about 90% of the possible
outcomes would equal or exceed the required 7.5 multiple. The 7.5
multiple is really something of a “soft floor” value, and the actual
working target amount will need to be larger. With any set of
economic assumptions the range of the distribution is a function of
the investment risk. Since a specific investment process was
defined in the previous section, the Monte Carlo simulation model
can be used to determine what the median accumulation target is
for a distribution that meets the 90% confidence objective. The
process actually involves an iterative test of multiple variables,
but in the illustrations used for this Article, I derived a target
accumulation at age 65 equal to 8.85 times final pay.
With a working target amount at age 65, plus a specific
investment process, there are various contribution schedules that
will meet the target under a set of economic assumptions. Chart 2
shows the contribution schedule that I am using for this Article.
Chart 2

Total contributions starting at age 25 are equal to 8% of pay.
The contributions then increase in 2% steps for each year between
ages 30 and 33, reaching an ultimate level of 16% of pay from age
33 through retirement. The way that the contributions are split
between employee and employer is a political choice parameter
discussed later, but for the illustrations in this Article, I have
assumed that contributions are split evenly.
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The graded pattern of contributions seems preferable to a
flat schedule, as it reflects the kind of choices typically made by
participants in 401(k) programs. These observed patterns
presumably reveal the desired preferences of workers, and reflect
the fact that younger workers put less value on retirement
savings, as compared with other financial needs.
For many people, these contribution rates may seem
surprisingly high, but they reflect what is really needed to meet
the required target with about a 90% level of confidence. The rates
really reflect the trade off between risk and reward—an
arrangement with low risk will require larger inputs to meet the
required target. Many employers in the U.S. have walked away
from defined benefit programs because they do not like the
financial risk exposure. Workers should reasonably expect that
their risk in a defined contribution arrangement would be
restricted to a manageable level. There is a cost for this protection,
but I believe it is an essential part of any Pillar 2 core benefit
arrangement. These issues are discussed more in Section 5.3.
F. Automatic Tracking Adjustments
The truly unique feature of the Tracker Plan is a set of
automatic adjustments that will help keep accumulations on the
desired path toward the required target. These adjustment
provisions are a key part of the risk control process, and they
facilitate a sharing of risk between workers and employers. There
are two types of adjustments:
1. If performance is adverse and the fund is tracking below the
desired target path, then additional contributions may be triggered,
up to a fixed maximum add-on.
2. If performance is favorable and the fund is tracking above the
desired target path, then the investment risk may be reduced to
preserve the cushion.

The tracking process does not need to be done at the
individual participant level, as long as all plan features remain
standardized. A hypothetical account can be tracked for each of the
tracker funds, based on the assumption of a median-income
worker making the scheduled contributions, and earning the
investment returns actually realized by that tracker fund. The
tracking error for this hypothetical account will be monitored, and
on an annual basis the level of the tracking error will be used to
trigger any needed automatic adjustments for all of the workers in
that tracker fund. As such, within each tracker fund, workers will
all be treated in exactly the same way.
First we need to develop the accumulation path that will
serve as the tracking benchmark. Making assumptions about
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expected returns and inflation (and reflecting the uncertainty of
these by using the Monte Carlo simulation model) we can input
the year-by-year contribution rates from the schedule described in
Section 3.4 and accumulate these fund returns based on the
tracker fund allocations described in Section 3.3. The resulting
accumulation values at each age can be expressed as a percent of
pay, and the result is a range of pay multiples at each age that
might be expected. The median value from this simulation range
can then be used as our tracking benchmark. Tracking error will
be measured against this benchmark, and the tracking error will
determine what kind of automatic adjustment, if any, needs to be
made for all the participants in that tracker fund. Chart 3 shows
the benchmark pay multiples that I am using for this Article (note
that the ending value at age 65 is the 8.85 value mentioned in the
previous section).
Chart 3

The schedule of adjustments based on tracking error was
developed using the Monte Carlo simulation model to iteratively
test and then refine various choices for these adjustment factors,
until the level of risk control could not be further improved
without adding significant complexity. The resulting adjustment
factors used for this Article are shown in Chart 4. I have chosen to
begin the adjustment process at age 40, which is around the latest
age where the process could control downside risk to the needed
degree.
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Chart 4

An issue that could arise is whether any additional
adjustment contributions should be shared between the worker
and the employer. This is certainly possible, but in my
illustrations I assume that all additional contributions are from
the employer. This is the preferred approach since the worker ends
up taking on any residual risk under any defined contribution
plan, including the Tracker Plan. Thus, the additional
contributions are the primary way for the employer to share in the
overall risk of the program.
Another issue is whether a claw-back arrangement can be
used when the employer makes additional contributions, which
later became unnecessary because strong investment performance
creates a significantly positive tracking error. Again, this is
possible and would lower the expected cost somewhat, but this
analysis assumes that the additional complexity does not warrant
such a feature.
The need for additional contributions is fairly obvious when
a significant negative tracking error develops, but the adjustment
to a lower risk investment policy in response to a positive tracking
error may be less intuitive. The idea is that if a sufficiently large
safety cushion has developed, relative to the 75% total income
replacement target, then downside risk can be further controlled
by effectively locking in the safety margin. The amount of
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incremental risk control is actually fairly modest in the Monte
Carlo simulation, but we will see later how effective this feature
would have been for workers retiring in 2009—essentially dodging
the 2008 market turbulence. Because of this I believe the feature
is worthwhile.
G. Participant Communication and Retirement Planning
The Tracker Plan provides an extremely useful frame of
reference for communication with participants. They should all get
regular communication materials on how well their tracker fund is
progressing toward the desired target—for the hypothetical
worker that serves as the benchmark for his or her age cohort they
will see what the current accumulation is as a multiple of pay, and
how this compares with the target multiple at that age. If they
have contributed fully since at least age 25, then they will also
know how well they are progressing, as their own accumulation
should closely track that of the benchmark. Accumulated funds as
a multiple of current pay becomes a very powerful and intuitive
metric when there is a benchmark multiple to compare with. A
worker who has not made full contributions, or whose pay has
exceeded the cap, can quickly see how much less her own pay
multiple is compared with the current multiple achieved by her
tracker fund. Also, the worker can compare her pay multiple with
the target pay multiple for her age. Convenient online tools could
be utilized to demonstrate how additional supplemental savings
could close any pay multiple gap. Also, the Tracker Plan has some
natural points during the career when retirement planning
communication efforts could be more concentrated and focused—
such as age 35 when they first enter their tracker fund, and again
at age 40 when the first automatic adjustments may be made.
H. Portability and Plan Distributions
Portability is a measure of how well benefits are preserved
when a career is broken into many segments with different
employers. Full portability is when a worker receives exactly the
same benefit whether or not the worker has worked for a single
employer during his or her entire career, or if they worked for
fifteen or twenty different employers. For a core Pillar 2 benefit
arrangement, full portability is very important. All defined
contribution plans start from a position of strength because the
benefits are embedded in an actual account balance. For the
Tracker Plan, all that is needed for full portability is (1) immediate
100% vesting, (2) preservation of the current tracker fund account
until the worker is re-employed, and (3) the transference of the
account to an equivalent tracker fund at re-employment. The
Tracker Plan allows this because provisions and tracker funds are
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standardized and employers are mandated to enroll new workers
in a plan. The worker would resume participation under the same
conditions with the new employer (contribution schedule,
investment risk, and adjustment process), and stay on the same
path toward his or her target.
In-service hardship withdrawals and loans could probably be
allowed, but the conditions and administration of these provisions
should be such that retirement savings objectives are not
compromised. Only restricted amounts should be made available
for such distributions.
Finally, the form of distribution at retirement should focus
on preserving the standard of living through the worker’s
remaining lifetime. This is an area of constant development, and,
ideally, the Tracker Plan would remain flexible enough to benefit
from these new developments. However, it is important that the
plan include at least some level of mandated “long-life” protection
so that old age poverty is prevented for almost all workers.
One possible way to accomplish this may be through a lateage deferred annuity (e.g. with benefits commencing at age 80 or
85) where the benefit payable would be based on some reasonable
multiple of the poverty level, less available Social Security
benefits, indexed at a fixed percentage such as 2% or 2.5% per
year. This annuity insurance could be distributed through private
insurers or through a cooperative beneficial fund maintained (with
some governmental back up) for a large pool of retired workers.
The cost of this annuity protection at retirement could be based on
an assumed 2% real return to avoid fluctuating annuity buy-in
prices, with some form of participating adjustment made when
payments commence, in order to reflect actual investment
experience and mortality patterns that have emerged over the
deferral period. If the initial pricing was conservative enough, then
the participation effects would typically create a positive
adjustment.
For remaining funds after the purchase of the late-age
deferred annuity, I suggest a default into a conservatively invested
fund, with a type of structured payout pattern. If lump sum
distributions are allowed, they might be restricted in size to a
fraction of final pay, and there might be some modest tax penalties
imposed to discourage lump sum payouts. A range of other lifetime
annuity options should also be made available.
IV. TESTS OF EFFECTIVENESS
This section explores how well the Tracker Plan concept
works. Section 4.1 illustrates how the Tracker Plan would have
operated through two specific periods that replicate historical
periods. Section 4.2 summarizes the key outcomes across a
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complete range of periods that replicate all historical experience
since 1926. Finally, Section 4.3 shows the distributions of results
under the Monte Carlo simulation model.
A. Two Illustrations
This section shows how the tracking process works over two
specific illustrative periods, reflecting the actual historical
experience for inflation, wage inflation, and investment returns.
Specifically, the following information has been used to illustrate
how the accumulation and tracking adjustments would operate:
- Risk asset portfolio: For these returns I have used a portfolio of
60% U.S. equities (total stock market) and 40% non-U.S.
equities (developed markets, plus emerging markets since
1988).
- Bond portfolio: For these returns I have used the Barclays Capital
Aggregate Index since 1976, and long-term government bonds
prior to that.
- Real stable value portfolio: For these returns I have used inflation
plus 2%.

The first illustrative period covers the forty years from 1969
through 2008. This period is of special interest because it is the
most recent, and ended with the turbulent market results of 2008,
which created significant trauma for many individuals who will
soon be reaching retirement age. Chart 5 shows the year-by-year
investment returns for the risk portfolio, the bond portfolio, and
the CPI results. It also illustrates the average compound results
over the full period and also over the last fifteen years. In a
defined contribution plan the last fifteen years are especially
important because that is when account balances are large and
returns carry more weight on the ultimate outcome.
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Chart 5

This time period reflects the following characteristics:
- High inflation early on, during the seventies and early eighties,
followed by relatively low and stable inflation.
- Very good equity returns prior to 2008; and even with 2008 the
average real returns on equities is reasonable, although below
the long-term average real return of 6.0% for 1926 through
2008.
- Weak bond returns early on as a result of the unexpected inflation
during the seventies and early eighties, followed by very strong
bond returns thereafter. The 4.5% real bond return during the
last fifteen years is well above the long-term average real
return of 2.1% for 1926 through 2008.

The Tracker Plan would have performed very well under
these historical conditions:
- The final total replacement ratio (including the same 32.0% Social
Security benefit mentioned earlier for a 2049 retirement at age
65) is 93.8% or 18.8 percentage points higher than the 75%
minimum target.
- No additional contributions were triggered during this forty-year
period.
- Because of strong tracker fund returns, a significantly positive
tracking error developed. This led to reductions in the risk asset
allocation starting at age 42, and the fund had no risk asset
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exposure after age 60. Because of these adjustments the large
negative equity returns for 2008 had no impact at all on the
final outcome.

Chart 6 shows the accumulation pattern, relative to the
target path. Chart 7 shows the way that the asset allocation was
adjusted.
Chart 6

Chart 7

The second illustrative period covers the forty years from
1942 through 1981. This period is of special interest because it is
one of the most difficult periods overall for long-term retirement
savings during the last eighty plus years. Chart 8 shows the yearby-year investment returns for the risk portfolio, the bond
portfolio, and the CPI results during that period. It also shows
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average compound results over the full period, and also over the
last fifteen years.
Chart 8

This time period reflects the following characteristics:
- Periods of high inflation early on during the post World War II
period, and then again during the seventies and early eighties,
the period just before retirement. High and unexpected inflation
just before retirement is one of the major risk factors for
retirement savings. Income needs become quickly inflated, and
this is accompanied by sharply negative bond returns and also
usually by poor equity returns, with no time to recover losses
before retirement. For this period the average price inflation
over the last fifteen years is almost 6%.
- Over the whole period the average real return on equities was
5.3%, fairly close to the long-term average of 6.0%. However,
over the critical final fifteen-year period the average real return
was only 1.5%.
- Real bond returns were extremely poor, with an average of -1.7%
for the full period and -2.1% during the final fifteen-year period.
This is the reason that a real stable value fund using TIPS
investments can be an important risk control tool for the years
just before retirement.
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Despite this very difficult economic environment, the
Tracker Plan would have performed reasonably well with this
experience:
- The final total replacement ratio (including the same 32.0% Social
Security benefit mentioned earlier for a 2049 retirement at age
65) is 79.5% or 4.5 percentage points higher than the 75%
minimum target.
- The key reason for the favorable outcome was that the automatic
tracking and adjustment process triggered additional
contributions during twelve of the final fourteen years. During
these twelve years the average additional contribution was 3.9%
of pay.
- Because of strong tracker fund returns in the early years, the
automatic adjustment process led to some reductions in the risk
asset allocation between ages 40 and 50, but by age 50 the
normal allocations had been restored.

Chart 9 compares the accumulation pattern with the target
path. Chart 10 shows the pattern of additional contributions, and
Chart 11 shows the way that the asset allocation was adjusted.
Chart 9

Do Not Delete

2013]

10/18/2013 4:27 PM

The Tracker Plan

701

Chart 10

Chart 11

B. Complete Historical Replication
This section extends the same type of analysis used in the
preceding section and shows how the Tracker Plan would have
performed over all rolling forty-year time periods between 1926
and 2008. Chart 12 shows the total replacement ratio outcomes for
all of these periods, or cohorts, representing what individuals
retiring in each year from 1966 through 2009 would have received
from the Tracker Plan plus Social Security (always using the same
32.0% Social Security benefit from 2049). As a benchmark for
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comparison, I have also plotted the replacement ratios that would
have been achieved by a typical 401(k) participant under the same
economic conditions. For a typical 401(k) plan, I have assumed the
following:
- Full participation from age twenty-five through age sixty-five
retirement, with employee contributions of 6% of pay each year.
- Employer contributions each year equal to 3% of pay, based on a
50% match.
- Investment in a target date fund typical of those currently used
by 401(k) plans, with an initial allocation to equities of 90%,
starting to grade down at age 35 to an ultimate level of 50% at
age 65.
- Note that the results do not reflect a typical participant—they
reflect a (rare) participant who continuously maximizes
participation from age 25 up to age 65 in a typical plan.

Chart 12

Chart 12 shows that the Tracker Plan total replacement
rates are almost always above the 75% floor target. Only for the
first ten cohorts (reflecting retirements from 1966 through 1975)
are there shortfalls. These shortfalls are usually less than 1.0
percentage point and never more than 2.5 percentage points. After
this point all of the cohorts are above the 75% floor target, usually
by very substantial margins for the later cohorts. On the other
hand, the 401(k) benefits are much more volatile, with the first 20
cohorts experiencing replacement ratios below the critical level of
70% (“critical” because it is very hard for a median-income worker
to handle that level of shortfall). Six of these 401(k) cohorts
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experience replacement ratios at or below the 60% level, which is
characterized as an extreme shortfall for a core retirement benefit.
Across all forty-four cohorts the average replacement ratios are
82.6% for the Tracker Plan and 77.8% for the typical 401(k) plan.
The Tracker Plan contributions are significantly higher than the
401(k) plan, but the key result is the stability of results and the
downside risk protection—driven by a less risky investment profile
and by the automatic adjustment process.
Chart 13 shows the average contribution rates made for each
of the forty-four cohorts in this analysis, including the regular
employee contributions and the 100% matching employer
contributions, plus any additional contributions triggered for that
cohort by the automatic adjustment process. For this purpose I
have assumed that individuals in the cohort are at or below the
pay cap for their entire career, and all rates are averaged over the
forty-year career.
Chart 13

Some additional contributions were triggered for almost all
of the cohorts, with the exception of the last three. The average
additional rate across all forty-four cohorts is 1.3% of pay. The
highest value is 3.3% for the very first cohort (reflecting an
individual retiring in 1966, who started contributing in 1926).
After the 1972 cohort the additional contributions never exceed 2%
of career pay.
Of course the way employers would actually experience
additional contributions for any year is a blended average of the
twenty-five cohorts between ages forty and sixty-four, since these
are the only ages where additional contributions would be
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triggered. It is possible that some of these cohorts may have
additional contributions triggered because of poor tracker fund
results, while others may have no additional contributions. Chart
14 shows the blended average employer contribution rates (the
regular 100% match, plus any additional contributions for all
cohorts) expressed as a percentage of total payroll. The total
payroll used reflects a distribution of individuals at different ages
and at different pay levels, based on U.S. Census Bureau data
from the 2008 Current Population Survey for individuals who
worked full time on a year-round basis. This includes individuals
below age twenty-five, for whom it is assumed that no
contributions were made, and individuals with pay above the
$50,000 pay cap, where it reflects only contributions made on pay
up to the cap. Above age twenty-five 100% participation is
assumed in the Tracker Plan, up to the pay cap.
Chart 14

The chart shows that the regular 100% matching
contribution on pay up to a $50,000 cap works out to just less than
5% of total payroll. Additional contributions were triggered for
each of the first twenty-two years, driven to a large extent by the
combination of very high and unexpected inflation during the
1970s and early 1980s, plus very poor real rates of investment
returns. However, except for a few years, the additional
contributions do not exceed 2% of total payroll, and for the highest
year the additional contribution rate was 2.75% of total payroll.
After that there are no additional contributions until 2009, when
the 2008 equity market losses would have triggered additional
contributions equal to 1.2% of total payroll.
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The results in Charts 12 and 14 have important implications.
The interpretation is that a Tracker Plan framework, if in place
over the last eighty-plus years would have: (A) provided all retired
workers at or below the median income level with a secure, and
fully funded, retirement benefit sufficient for maintenance of their
standard of living though-out retirement; (B) provided all retired
workers above the median income level with a secure, and fully
funded, base benefit that would prevent their standard of living
from falling below that of a medium earning worker; (C) provided
all current workers with a fully funded account balance that is on
track towards meeting their retirement needs; and (D) required
annual employer contributions within a range of about 5% to
7.75% of payroll (with no exposure to unfunded liabilities).
Compared to what our current system offers, these results offer a
powerful indication of the aggregate economic efficiency of the
Tracker Plan approach.
C. Monte Carlo Simulation Analysis
This section provides the results of a Monte Carlo simulation
of Tracker Plan results. The simulation analysis creates the full
range of possible outcomes under reasonable assumptions about
the expected levels of future returns and inflation, but also reflects
the degree of uncertainty about each of these assumptions. This
uncertainty is the fundamental source of financial risk, and the
simulation analysis thus becomes the most critical tool for shaping
the risk control mechanisms of the Tracker Plan to minimize the
probability of unacceptable shortfall outcomes.
The simulation model used here is essentially the same one
used in my work with large defined benefit pension plans to help
the sponsors understand the financial risk of investment policy
decisions. Some of the key assumptions and model features are
discussed below:
- Price inflation: An average price inflation assumption of 2.8% is
used, which is the same as that used by the Social Security
actuaries for their intermediate long-term projections. The
model used here is a nonlinear one that includes both mean
reversion effects (i.e., the operation of the Federal Reserve), and
surprise inflation events that can become persistent through
self-reinforcing effects. The resulting distributions of rates of
inflation are skewed to the high end, so while the mean value
for any year (or period of years) is 2.8%, the median value is
2.6%.
- Wage inflation: Real wage growth is assumed to average 1.15%
per year, again matching the intermediate assumption used by
the Social Security actuaries.
- Merit and promotional pay increases: For the median-income
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earner used in this analysis, it is assumed that starting pay at
age twenty-five is equal to $30,000. Each year the level of pay is
then increased by 1.6% until it reaches $44,613 at age fifty.
After that increases in the pay level of 0.25% are assumed each
year. The final pay level at age sixty-five is $46,613. This career
pattern for pay growth very closely matches the observed
pattern for medium earners.
- Bond returns: The long-term real return on bonds is assumed to
average 2.9%, and the uncertainty is based on historical
experience. The return distributions reflect the combined effects
of inflation, inflation risk premiums, real yield rates, and credit
spreads.
- Returns on the risk asset portfolio: For this analysis the risk asset
portfolio is modeled as a simple blend of 60% U.S. equities and
40% non-U.S. equities. In actual practice a more diversified
approach would be expected, similar to what a sophisticated
defined benefit sponsor might use for its risk asset portfolio
construction. For the blended equity portfolio in the model an
average long-term (i.e. compound, or geometric average) real
return of 5.35% is assumed. The resulting equity risk premium
(spread of equity returns over bond returns) is 2.35%. Both of
these average values are less than historical averages (from
1926 through 2008 the average real return on this type of
portfolio would have been 6.0%, and the average equity risk
premium would have been 3.8%). This reflects both a deliberate
choice to be slightly conservative, and a forward looking view of
real economic growth potential—which is a primary driver of
equity returns over the long term. The uncertainty for risk asset
returns is based on historical experience, and produces a
standard deviation of 16.5%. However, the returns are not
normally distributed, as here, a model is used that reflects the
potential for periods (such as the 2008-2009 period) where
markets become very turbulent and large negative returns are
likely. Specifically, a regime-switching lognormal model is used,
and the resulting distribution of returns can be characterized as
having a “fat tail” that captures extra downside risk, especially
over shorter time periods.

Based on these assumptions, it is now possible to model the
range of outcomes from the Tracker Plan for our hypothetical
median wage worker who participates from age twenty-five
through retirement (normally age sixty-five, except I use an age
sixty-six retirement for one of the examples). Chart 15 uses
“floating bar” style graphics to show the percentile distributions
for the total replacement ratio outcomes, and the table shows the
probability of shortfalls for the 70% to 75% range, and for below
70%. These shortfall probabilities are the key metric for risk
control, and the goal was for the total shortfall probability (below
75% replacement ratio) to be around 10% for retirement at age
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sixty-five, and to be close to zero for retirement at age sixty-six.
The chart shows results for various scenarios:
- The leftmost bar is a benchmark for comparison that is based on
forty years of continuous participation in a typical 401(k) plan,
as described in the previous section. The median replacement
ratio here is 73%. The total shortfall probability is 53%, but
included in that is a 45% probability of falling below a 70%
replacement ratio. If just the bottom quartile of results is
examined, the average replacement ratio is only 53%. To put
this in context, that is the equivalent of providing a retirement
program to a median pay worker and telling him that if he
participates in the program for 40 years, there is still a 1-in-4
chance that when he retires he may have to cut his standard of
living from what would then be his $47,000 pay level to the
standard of living for someone who was only earning $33,000.
This level of shortfall risk is far too great for a core Pillar 2
retirement program. Higher income workers may be able to
handle this level of risk, but not workers at median income
levels.
- The next bar is the Tracker Plan, but without the automatic
adjustment features. Relative to the first bar showing results
for a typical 401(k) plan, the results in this bar reflect the
higher contribution schedule in the Tracker Plan and the lower
level of investment risk in the tracker fund from reduced
allocations to the risk asset. The median replacement ratio is
81%, and the total shortfall risk has been reduced to 29%. This
provides better risk control, but more is needed.
- The next bar is the Tracker Plan, including the automatic
adjustment features. Here the median replacement ratio is a bit
higher at 82%, but the total shortfall risk has been reduced to
12%. This is now close to our goal of having about 90%
confidence that a worker would meet at least the 75%
replacement ratio target. Furthermore, when a shortfall does
occur it is usually relatively modest—there is less than a 3%
probability of falling below 70%.
- In the next scenario supplemental contributions of 2% of pay
starting at age fifty are added. The purpose is to show how the
shortfall risk can be reduced for workers who approach
retirement and see that they are falling short of the target
accumulation path. The total shortfall risk has been reduced to
6%.
- Finally, in the last scenario results are shown for a worker
retiring at age sixty-six, one year beyond the typical retirement
age of sixty-five used in each of the preceding scenarios. Here
the shortfall risk is cut to just 2%. This achieves the goal of
ensuring that when a shortfall risk does occur, working no more
than one additional year beyond age 65 can eliminate it.
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Chart 15

The simulation model can also be used to analyze the likely
extent of additional contributions that may be triggered under the
automatic adjustment provisions. The histogram in Chart 16
shows the probability of additional contributions for any cohort at
specified levels (expressed as a percent of career pay). There is a
33% probability that no additional contributions will be triggered
at all. The average additional contribution is 1.0% of covered pay
(i.e. pay up to the pay cap). For the worst 10% of outcomes the
average rate is 4.2%. Although this is a subjective judgment, this
level of cost risk is something that sponsors should be able to
manage well—it is certainly much less than the cost risk from a
typical defined benefit pension plan.
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Chart 16

V. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
The federal government must take the lead role in a
reformation of the retirement system. The Tracker Plan program
is designed to provide a strong Pillar 2 arrangement that can
supplement Social Security in such a way that a large majority of
workers can expect to maintain a reasonable standard of living
through their retirement years. Numerous political choices must
be made as part of any major reform effort, however, the
effectiveness of the final program will ultimately depend on these
political choices. This section reviews some of the more important
areas where public policy choices will be required.
A. Coverage
No decision will be more important to the aggregate
effectiveness of reform than the decision on how workers will be
covered under the program. The current scheme of plans
voluntarily sponsored by employers has left over half of the U.S.
workforce without retirement plan coverage. With the current
individual IRA-type arrangements, lower paid workers do not
participate in significant numbers. To have a real impact on
increasing the retirement savings throughout our economy a
muscular approach is needed. A full mandate that all workers
participate in the program might be overkill, and would likely find
lukewarm Congressional support, but it should be considered as
an option. Absent a full individual mandate, it is likely that the
program will require that all employers automatically enroll new
employees into a Pillar 2 program and make the needed payroll
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deductions. Employees could then have the option to decline
participation, or to participate at a rate lower than the regular
contribution schedule. Nonparticipating workers could then be
auto-enrolled again at certain ages. The ideal situation would be
that plans that do not attain at least 95% coverage of workers (age
thirty and up) should institute special operational and
communication efforts to raise their coverage levels.
B. Uniformity
When a program, like the Tracker Plan, is designed with
very specific risk control objectives, uniformity of provisions is
then critical for success. A wide range of choices may make sense
for higher-income individuals, but lower- and middle-income
workers need to have a simple framework for retirement savings
that is the same from one employer to the next, where continuity
of savings over the full career is a real necessity. All tracker funds
should use the same basic asset allocation glide path, and any
grouping of age cohorts (e.g. into three-year age groups) must be
uniform from fund to fund. The regular contribution schedule and
the automatic adjustment procedures should be uniform, and also
be based on a uniform target accumulation path so that the
tracking error concept can carry from one plan to another.
Uniformity of these features is likely to be resisted by the financial
services industry, but innovative product designs and choices can
still be preserved for supplemental plans that cover the higher
paid workers who have the interest and skills required to utilize
choice effectively.
C. Size of Benefits and Employer Cost
The design in this Article was based on a reasonable income
replacement target of 75% of pay, and the resulting contribution
schedule creates a high confidence of successfully meeting the
target. A lower contribution schedule would necessarily require
some combination of changes to these factors:
- A lower replacement ratio target than the 75% that is used here
(even though recognition of medical costs might argue for a
higher target, not a lower one).
- A higher retirement age target, such as age sixty-six or sixtyseven.
- An assumption of lower post-retirement benefit increases.
- A lower pay cap, which would mean that median level earners
would not have full coverage.
- A lower standard of risk control, which might also accommodate
more investment risk.
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The determination of how costs are split between employees
and employers is also a public policy choice. The legal framework
of the Tracker Plan could allow some level of choice for the
employer, but there should also be some arrangement of tax
incentives so that employers are strongly encouraged to
underwrite a significant share of the cost. There could also be
rules that require some level of employer cost sharing before the
employer could implement any form of tax favored supplemental
plan for its higher paid employees.
Finally, the Tracker Plan concept could be implemented as a
two-part arrangement. For example, the Basic Tracker Plan might
only cover pay up to a lower limit like $25,000—and this is where
incentives and penalties for cost sharing could be stronger. Then
an Extended Tracker Plan could cover pay from $25,000 to $75,000
with more employer flexibility on cost sharing.
There is a major advantage of working within a framework
like the Tracker Plan. This is because it forces a real discipline
and transparency on the process that connects the cost of the
program with very specific objectives for the key features that
determine benefit adequacy, which includes:
- The replacement ratio target at a selected retirement age;
- The degree of post-retirement inflation protection; and
- The extent of risk control, expressed in terms of a confidence goal
for outcomes.

Wide ranges of choices are available, and each will vary in
terms of cost and benefit adequacy. In fact, there is a direct link
between these two features. As one example of a radically scaledback Tracker Plan design, three changes can be made from the
design discussed in this Article:
- Shift the target retirement age from age sixty-five up to age sixtyseven;
- Eliminate any postretirement increases in benefit levels; and,
- Drop the confidence target for avoiding shortfall outcomes from
90% to 80%.

The Tracker Plan can be designed to meet these revised
objectives with a contribution schedule of 5.2% of pay each year.
This is a dramatic reduction from the contribution schedule used
for the basic design analyzed in this Article (which starts at 8% of
pay, then increases to 16% of pay at age thirty-three). However,
this reflects a severe reduction in overall benefit adequacy. This
particular scaled-back version of the Tracker Plan would
essentially be equivalent to a defined benefit pension plan that
provides a benefit of 1% times final five-year average pay for each
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year of service, with a normal retirement age of 67, no early
retirement subsidies, and no post-retirement COLA provision.
The single most important principle in economics is “nullum
gratuitum prandium” (“There is no free lunch” . . . it just sounds
classier in Latin)—and The Tracker Plan framework makes all the
trade-offs very apparent. Section 7 explores these trade-offs in
more detail.
D. Operational Framework
Many employers are either unable, or unwilling, to sponsor
and administer a retirement plan for their employees. This is
especially apparent among smaller employers, as the
administrative and legal obligations are far from trivial. To ensure
broad worker coverage, employers should be relieved of any need
to sponsor their own plan. As stated earlier, the primary obligation
for employers is to enroll their employees in a program, make the
required payroll deductions for employee contributions and
transfer these contributions (plus any employer contributions) to
the fund manager.
Therefore, outside organizations are required to run the
program in a professional and cost-effective way. Reform efforts
should include enabling legislation for the creation of large,
regional not-for-profit organizations for this purpose. This is an
idea promoted by others, including Keith Ambachtsheer.4 The
objective of low expense levels for administration and investment
activities is very important—and these kinds of organizations are
the best way to set the standard. Some current organizations like
the Federal Thrift Savings Plan and TIAA-CREF provide good
models. Private for-profit organizations could offer products, but
they should win their business with good management and not
with high marketing costs. Large employers that want to sponsor
their own plan should also be permitted to do that.
This Article also encourages reorganization of federal
oversight and regulatory bodies with respect to retirement issues.
A single cabinet level position is needed with responsibility for
Social Security, Medicare, and the oversight and regulation of all
Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 arrangements. This person would have a
mechanism to set broad standards for all retirement
administration organizations and to monitor their effectiveness.
E. Investment Framework
This Article previously stated the importance of having all
tracker funds operated with the same basic glide-path allocations
4. KEITH P. AMBACHTSHEER, PENSION REVOLUTION: A SOLUTION TO THE
PENSIONS CRISIS (Wiley Finance 2007).
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and cohort groupings. Beyond this, the funds should have
significant leeway for using all available investment vehicles that
help them achieve the objective of earning a high real return (net
of fees) over the appropriate time period for each tracker fund age
cohort. The best current model would be large defined benefit
plans that:
- Utilize both outside managers who can add value, and in-house
management when cost effective.
- Seek the lowest fees for the services and skills obtained.
- Carefully monitor all managers.
- Continuously research capital market opportunities.
- Have a well-organized governance structure.
- Set long-term objectives, and determine the best policy to meet
those objectives.

The biggest difference from defined benefit investment
operations is that the tracker fund objectives are much more
specific in nature. Specifically, there is a fixed timeframe, and
there are clearly stated risk control objectives. This should vastly
improve the ability of fund managers to set policy and monitor
progress.
The potential also exists for large tracker funds to lead the
way for the creation of newer products (or at least a deeper and
more efficiently priced market for long-dated equity market
options) centered on risk control (downside insurance). As the
funds approach their maturity dates, they may be willing to pay a
premium for downside insurance, and could quantitatively
determine a reasonable level of premium for the desired level of
protection. Other funds, further from their maturity date, could
then judge whether selling that insurance to these mature funds
and earning the premiums is a desirable activity that might
enhance their own long-term return objectives. The premiums may
be a combination of fixed dollar amounts, plus some degree of
upside participation rights.
F. Supplemental Plans and Tax Incentives
The Tracker Plan is envisioned as a core Pillar 2 benefit. A
Tracker Plan program with the features described in this Article,
using a pay cap of around $50,000 (2009 dollars), would ensure
that half of the workforce has what they need for a secure
retirement. Those who earn above the median level of pay would
need supplemental plans for additional savings or benefits to
reach the same level of income replacement—but even without any
supplemental coverage the Tracker Plan would provide a
substantial floor of retirement income for them as well.
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Supplemental plans could take various forms. The most
direct would be an Extended Tracker Plan, which would base
contributions on total pay (up to some maximum similar to the
current $245,000 for qualified plans). These contributions could be
consolidated into the same tracker fund account as the regular
Tracker Plan contributions for simplicity of administration and
investment.
Other
supplemental
defined
contribution
arrangements could be sponsored by the employer, or provided in
the retail market to individuals, with much more flexibility on
level of contributions (on pay over the Tracker Plan cap), employer
match levels and investment options. Employer-sponsored defined
benefit supplemental plans could also be designed to “wrap
around” the expected benefits from the Tracker Plan.
Regulation of these supplemental arrangements could be
accomplished by a simplified set of plan qualification standards—
the uniform provisions in the Tracker Plan should eliminate the
need for much of the current regulatory maze. I believe that one
simple rule could be quite effective in this area—namely that no
employer contributions could flow into a supplemental
arrangement until some specified level of cost sharing was reached
in the regular Tracker Plan for that employer.
Currently tax revenue forgone because of tax-preferred
retirement savings arrangements is about 1% of the GDP. Pension
reform efforts should include a close examination of who benefits
from these tax expenditures and the degree to which they further
the broad national interest. Opportunities should exist for
restructuring these tax benefits in ways that better support the
goal of expanding retirement savings opportunities across the
population. The tax treatment of supplemental plans may differ
from the basic Pillar 2 program, and incentives may be focused on
employers, especially small employers, to encourage a sufficient
level of cost sharing in the Pillar 2 plans.
VI. COMPARISON WITH COMPARABLE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN
One possible reaction to the Tracker Plan described in this
Article is that the cost is too high. This is perhaps based on
previous experience with traditional defined benefit pension plans
where the expected long term cost often falls into a range of 5% to
10% of payroll for corporate plans (with no post-retirement
COLAs), or 10% to 15% for public pension plans that include
COLA provisions. However, the benefits provided by the Tracker
Plan are substantially better than most traditional pension
arrangements, so cost comparisons need to be carefully framed.
This section first analyzes a few of the features that are part of the
Tracker Plan cost levels used in this Article:
- The 75% replacement ratio target includes the age sixty-five
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Social Security benefit expected to be available forty years from
now, in 2049. That benefit for a median level earner is 32% of
final pay, which compares with a benefit of about 40% of final
pay for a worker retiring in 2009 at age sixty-five. The benefit
needed to reach the 75% total replacement ratio target has
increased from 35% to 43% of final pay, a 23% increase in the
benefit level.
- The Tracker Plan is designed to provide post-retirement benefit
increases of 2.5% per year to control exposure to inflation risk.
Compared to a plan with no post-retirement increases, this adds
about another 30% to the cost.
- The benefit payouts from the Tracker Plan in this Article reflect
future mortality improvements expected over the next forty
years, which adds about another 8% to the cost. This cost is
seldom fully reflected in current defined benefit plan costs.
- The Tracker Plan provides full portability of benefits, which is not
provided in most defined benefit arrangements.

Next, this section constructs a more meaningful comparison,
where benefits provided are comparable. The following cash
balance pension plan would closely replicate both the accrual
pattern and the final retirement benefit (at the median expected
Tracker Plan benefit):
- Total pay-based credits to the cash balance account at the same
rates as the schedule used in the Tracker Plan, starting at 8% of
pay and increasing to 16% of pay by age 33.
- Employee contributions equal to half of these pay-based credits.
- Interest credits on the cash balance account equal to 7% each
year.
- Payout at age sixty-five retirement of the full cash balance
account, or using the account balance to purchase a risk-free
annuity with 2.5% post-retirement increases.
- Full and immediate vesting in the cash balance account.

When it is assumed that the sponsor adopts an investment
policy of 50% equities and 50% bonds the expected net employer
cost would be 4.9%, which is lower than the 8.5% for the Tracker
Plan (assuming a 50/50 cost sharing for the regular contributions).
However, if we look at only the outcomes in the worst decile, the
cost for the cash balance plan increases to 17.9%, while the
Tracker Plan increases only to 11.7%. At the second percentile
outcome, the cash balance cost is 21.5% and the Tracker Plan cost
is 12.0%.
If this degree of cost volatility is too much for the sponsor,
then a more conservative investment policy is required. With an
equity allocation of only 20%, the expected cash balance plan cost
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becomes 8.5% of pay, matching the Tracker Plan. Now the average
cost for the worst decile is 14.2% of pay, and the cost at the second
percentile outcome is 15.7% of pay. Nullum gratuitum prandium.
VII.FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF DESIGN
OPTIONS
For any retirement system, two metrics are critical:
1. What is the cost?
2. What benefits are provided?

In the real world, financial risk factors (investment returns
and inflation) create some level of uncertainty in either one, or
both, of these metrics on a forward-looking basis. This means that
a distribution of possible outcomes needs to be dealt with. The
important features of these outcomes can be captured in a chart
where projected benefits (expressed as a replacement ratio) are
plotted against cost. The points that are plotted should reflect both
expected (e.g. median) levels, as well as some measure of the range
of uncertainty (e.g. the average value for top and bottom decile
outcomes, which can be estimated using a Monte Carlo simulation
model). The range of uncertainty is the only way to quantify risk,
and any comparison of alternative retirement system designs must
incorporate a clear analysis of the risk to all stakeholders that is
embedded within the design structure.
Looking first at traditional plans, it can be seen that all of
the uncertainty is forced into a single dimension. For a 401(k) plan
all of the uncertainty emerges on the benefit metric. In a
traditional defined benefit pension plan all of the uncertainty
emerges on the cost metric. Chart 17 shows results for:
- The typical 401(k) plan described earlier (where the employer cost
is fixed at 3% of pay to provide a 50% match on a 6% employee
contribution), and
- A pension plan that targets a 75% replacement ratio at age sixtyfive (inclusive of Social Security), includes a post-retirement
COLA of 2.5%, and provides full and immediate vesting. In
determining employer cost, we assume the sponsor uses a 50/50
asset allocation, and that employees contribute 6% of their own
pay in order to participate.
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Chart 17

Contrary to these one-dimensional approaches, the Tracker Plan
operates in two dimensions. The same will be true for any other
plan that includes risk-sharing features. Chart 18 shows how the
Tracker Plan plots in this benefit/cost space. Chart 18 also plots
the location for the dramatically scaled-back Tracker Plan
described in Section 5.4 (labeled as Tracker Lite).
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Chart 18

These charts clearly convey most of the critical information
required to make meaningful comparisons among competing
options for pension reform. Each stakeholder naturally prefers to
receive good results without any risk, but the risk has to flow
somewhere. By explicitly showing the risk to each stakeholder, the
tradeoffs become transparent. Only then can we have a clear
dialogue for policy decisions.

